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IN THE SUPRE~ COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
DAVID HARMON MEINHP~T. Case No. 16421 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The aooellant, DAVID HARMON MEINHART, appeals from a 
conviction of Aggravated Assault, a Felony in the Third 
Jef::-ee. in t:!le Third J•.1dicial Dis trice, in and for Salt Lake 
County. State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, 
nesiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOweR COL~T 
i:1e appellant, DAVID HARMON MEINHART, was charged with 
.-'gg:-avated .-\ssau;.c pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103 (1953 
as a~ended) On the 16th day of February, 1979, the appellant 
·,.,.as fo•.1nd guilty of the offense as charged by a jury. 
Subsequent 1::. the appellant was sentenced to incarceration in 
::-:e ·.:ta!l State P:-ison for an indeterment term not to exceed 
:'ive :;ea::s. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The apoellant seeks reversal of the lower court and 
~e7anied back fo:- dismissal or a new trial. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The information issued by the office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney alleged: 
That on or about the 30th dav of 
May, 1978, in Salt Lake Coun-ty, 
State of Utah, the said David Harmon 
Meinhart did assault Angela Janda 
by an attempt, with unlawful force of 
violence to do bodily injury to Angela 
Janda (age 2), and did recklessly 
use such means or force likely 
to produce death or serious bodily 
injury to Angela Janda. 
On May 30th, the Appellant was placed in a relationship 
of in loco parentis as a babysitter to Angela Janda while 
Angela's mother was away. During this period, at approximate: 
7:00 p.!Tl., Angela suffered a head injury res'.1lting in 
brain damage. 
Sworn testimony established that •..Jithin c-~-o davs 
following the incident investigating officers had a least c~e 
and perhaps several, interviews w' th the Appellant (T. 125) 
Following these, Appellant was summoned to the main Sheri:f's 
office for further questioning by the same invest~gating 
officers, Detectives Bailess and Pechina (T 114) Prior 
to this the Appellant's father had requested of these office:' 
that his son not be questioned without the presence of an ate::-
as Appellant was somewhat slow witted for his age and was 
easily influenced by others (T. 125). This intervie·.., took 
place on June l, 1978, in an interrogation room at the Salt 
Lake County Metropolitan Hall of Justice As ide frorr: the 
Appellant, only Detective Bailess and Detecti•;e Pec~~na ·.,·ere 
-2-
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present; the interrogation being recorded on tape. The 
questioning was conducted from 10:10 in the morning until 
12 20 that afternoon. The Appellant was not informed of his 
constitutional rights, his right to remain silent. or his 
right to advice of counsel, in any form at the outset of 
the interrogation. Approximately half way through the 
questioning Detective Bailess gave the Appellant the full 
":!iranda warning". When asked if he desired to consult an 
attorney the Appellant in turn asked "what would be better?" 
Detective Bailess responded 'You know if you'd talk to an 
attorney he'd tell you not to say anything .you're going 
to feel a hell of alot better once it's out in the open" 
(Interrogation Transcript, page 21). Later on in the 
~nterview Detective Bailess, unsatisfied with the answers he 
'.-Jas getting, stated, "~low the sooner we can get it out. we can 
·.-;rap the thing up and talk to the County Attorney, and we can 
start ~orking on this help we talked about on the psychiatric, 
~ut ".-Je 're not getting anywhere this way" (Interrogation 
Transcript. page 33). And still later, Detective Bailess, 
continuing the theme of the theraputic help, said " ... 
get if off your conscience and then (sic) so we can start 
on the other program and that's getting you lined up in some 
c:,pe of ps::chiatric counseling, that you yourself admit you 
need" I In te rro rga t ion Transcript, page 36) . During the entire 
interview the only direct reference to the possibility of the 
Appel~ant's criminal liability were the formalized statement 
"<:r.e Constitution requires that I inform you anything you 
-3-
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say can be used in a court as evidence" and vague 
reference to "going to the County Attorney" which was in 
every instance couched in terms of arrangement for psychiatric 
counseling. 
At the time this interview took place the appellant 
was 20 years old and had completed his high school education 
only as far as the 11th grade and had only minimal 
employable skills. Prior to being charged in this offense 
the defendant had had no previous involvement •..Jith la1• 
enforcement officers or the criminal justice svstem. 
During the trial, appellant's father testi~ied that 
because of a severe accident some five years previous, 
appellant was noticeably less perceptive than the average 
boy his age and is easily pursuaded by people. 
During the interrogation. after the for.nal ":1iranda 
warning" had been given and after repeated assertions 
of disbelief by Detective Bailess, appellant ~inallv stated 
that he had struck the child with his open hand or the heel 
of his hand. The significance of appellant's "con~ession" 
at trial is aptly summarized by statements the orosecutor 
made during a pre-trial motion to exclude the interrogation 
. if the Court were to grant counsel's motion to supores' 
the confession, then of course we won't be able to allege 
specific conduct (by the appellant) '''hat conduct 
(appellant engaged in) we couldn't tell Hithout the confess:.-
(January 15th, 1979, Transcript page 3). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELUti~T WAS NOT PROPERLY WARNED AT THE OUTSET 
OF THE INTERROGATION OF HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT OR HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed. 2d 
694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A. L. R. 3d 974 (1966), the United 
States Supreme Court substantially changed the law with 
respect to criminal defendants' statements made to police 
~uring interrogation situations. The Court directly and 
pointedly addressed the potential problem of defendants being 
unduly and unfairly influenced by the tactics and atmosphere 
often present in police interrogations. The Court concluded 
that • 
.without proper safeguards the process 
of in custody interrogation of persons suspected 
of crime contains inherently compelling 
~ressures which work to undermine the individual's 
~ill to resist and to compel him to speak where 
~e would not otherwise do so freely. In order 
to combat these pressures and to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the accused must be 
adequately and effectively apprised of his rights 
and the exercise of those rights must be fully 
honored. 384 U.S. at 467. 
~e Court went on to elaborate as to its fears and the 
prosecutions t~ey c:!emanc:!ed: 
At t~e outset, if a person in custody 
is to be subjected to interrogation 
he ~ust be first informed in clear 
and unequivocal terms that he had the 
risht to remain silen.--- (And) 
-5-
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such a warning is an absolute 
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent 
pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. 
It is not just the subnormal or woefully 
ignorant who succumbe to an interrogator's 
implications, whether implied or 
expressly stated, that the interrogation 
will continue until a confession is 
obtained 
384 U.S. at 467-468 
The basic rule as expressed in ~iranda is that: 
. [T)he prosec~tion may not use 
statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpator;, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless 
it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the 
orivilege against self-incrimination. 
By custodial interrogation, we mean 
questioning intitiated bv law 
enforcement officers after a person 
has been taken into custodv or otherwise 
deprived of his freedom of. action in any 
significant way. As for the procedural 
safeguards to be emploved, unless other 
fully effective means are devised to 
inform accused persons of their right 
to silence and to assure a continuous 
opportunity to exercise it, the following 
measures are required. Prior to any 
questioning, the person must be warned 
that he had a right to remain silent, 
that any statement he does make may be 
used as evidence against him, and that he 
has a right to the presence of an attorney, 
either retained or appointed. The 
defendant may waive effectuation of these 
rights, provided the ~aiver is made 
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. 
If, however, he indicates in any manner and 
at any stage of the process that he wished 
to consult with an attorney before speaking 
there can be no questioning. Likewise, 
if the individual is alone and indicates 
in any manner that he does not wish to be 
interrogated, the police rna:: not r;ues cion 
hiiTI. The mere fact that he rna" ha·:e 
answered some questions or vol~nteered 
some statements on his o•..m does not depr~·:e 
him of the right to refrain from answer~n€ 
any further inquiries until he has consulted 
-6-
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with an attorney and thereafter 
consents to be. [Emphasis Supplied] 
[footnote omitted] 384 U.S. at 
444-445 
The first issue to be decided in determining a 
Miranda question is whether the defendant's statements were 
made in the course of a custodial interrogation. This 
was defined very basically as "questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way." [footnote omitted] 384 U.S. at 444. 
Some typical features of a custodial interrogation,the Court 
noted, were that the suspect was held incommunicado and 
the atmosphere of such an interrogation is police dominated. 
It is obvious that such an interrogation 
environment is created for no purpose 
other than to subjugate the individual 
to the will of his examiner. This 
atmosphere carries its own badge of 
intimidation, but it is equally destructive 
of human dignity. The current practice 
of incommunicado interrogation is at odds 
with one of our Nation's most cherished 
principles-- that the individual may not 
be compelled to incriminate himself. 
Unless adequate protective devices are 
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent 
in custodial surroundings, no statement 
obtained from the defendant can truly be 
the product of his free choice. [footnote 
omitted] 384 U.S. at 457-458. 
Susequent cases have clarified the Supreme Court's 
definition of custodial interrogation. In Mathis v. United 
States, 391 l!.S. 1, 20 L.Ed. 2d 381, 88 S.Ct. 1503, the 
Court found there was custodial interrogation for purposes 
of the "~liranda Rule" '"'here the defendant was in prison 
serving a state sentence when he was interrogated by federal 
-I-
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investigators regarding federal income tax fraud. In 
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 22 L.Ed. 2d 311, 89 S.Ct 
1095 (1969), the defendant had been questioned and he 
made incriminating statements in his room after he had 
been placed under arrest. The court stated that by placing 
the defendant under arrest the authorities had deprived the 
defendant's freedom of action in a significant way. 
However, in ewe recenc cases t~e court found that 
there was not custod~al ~~te==ogation. In Beckwith v 
United States, 425 U.S. 341, 48 L.Ed. 2d l, 96 S.Ct. 1612 
(1976), t'"Je court held that statements made by the petitior:.e:-
during an -~terview wit~ Internal Revenue Service agen:s 
did not amount to a custodial interrogation after the 
pet~tioner had become the focus of a tax investigation 
Beckwith is readily distinguished from the above cases and 
the present fact situation in that the intervie•..J took p:.ace 
in a friendly atmosphere at the defendant' ?rivate residence 
and that he was read a standard I.R.S. warning informing 
him that he had a right to remain silent andhad the right 
an attorney before answering. Defendant agreed to the 
interview after the warning was given. Defendant's con ten c:.:-
on appeal was that he had not been given the formal 
"Miranda warning"_ 
In the most recent case on the issue, Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 50 L.Ed. 2d 714, 97 S Ct 7ll (19"-
the court held that questioning of a suspect at the po~ice 
station from which the suspect was free to leave J:.d ~ot 
-8-
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amount to custodial interrogation. Mathiason had agreed 
to meet ~e investigator at the police station (the defendant 
himself having chose the police station as the most 
convenient). The atmosphere of the interview contained 
few if any of the " 
.compelling pressures which work 
to undermine the individual's will ... "that were such a 
central concern of the Miranda court. The interview was a 
one-on-one situation, lasting for a total of only 30 
minutes. The defendant confessed within the first five 
minutes of the interview and was then given the proper 
warning. It should also be noted that Mathiason was at 
that time a parolee under supervision and undoubtedly 
had a personal familiarity with the workings of the 
criminal justice system. In addition there was no 
indication that he was confused as to his rights or whether 
he should exercise them. 
',.Ji t!-1 regards to what: cons ti tu tes custodial interrogation 
as int:erpreted by the Utah Supreme Court is has been held 
chat: a brief questioning of the defendant by the victim in 
the court building prior to his arrest is not custodial 
interrogation, State v. Guerrero, 29 Utah 2d 243, 507 P.2d 
1029 (1973); nor is police questioning a suspect at his home 
in front of family and friends custodial interrogation, 
State v. Martinez. 23 Utah 2d 62, 457 P.2d 613 (1969). 
In this present case the Appellant had been interviewed 
ini tiall:: bv investigating officers. These same officers 
act:ing in their official capacity then requested that he 
-9-
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appear at their headquarters building for further 
questioning. The interrogation took place at the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice which contains the head-
quarters of the Salt Lake City Police Department, the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, and the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office. The questioning lasted for two hours 
and 20 minutes in an isolated room with only the Appellant 
and the two police officers present. The officers knew 
at that time the Appellant had been tending the victim 
when the injuries allegedly occurred, and the facts indicate 
that the officer's interest in him rose at least to the 
level of being a suspect in their investigation. All 
that Miranda requires is· 
[I]ncommunicado interrogation of 
individuals in a police dominated 
atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full 
warnings of constitutional rights. 
384 U.S. at 445. 
In short, this situation presents a 20 year old bo~. of 
less than average abilities, being confronted b~ nw adu::.t 
male policemen in an isolated room at police headquarters. 
confronted with continuous questions and expressions of 
disbelief in his answers. There is no way of knowing for 
sure if the Appellant would have been res trained had he tri.e·: 
to leave, but it cannot logically be imagined that the 
atmosphere of the interview or the attitude of the 
interrogators 'n1ould have been any more "custodial" 1:' the 
magic words "you are under arrest" had been uttered 
-10-
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by these officers. Under the letter and spirit of Miranda, 
and distinct from the facts in Beckwith, supra, and Mathiason, 
supra, this present situation falls unequivocally into the 
category of a custodial interrogation. 
The next question to be addressed is the 
constitutional necessity for a full "Miranda Warning" at 
the outset of the interrogation. The Supreme Court in Miranda 
specifically stated: 
Our aim is to assure that the 
individual's rights to choose 
between silence and speach remain 
unfettered throuEhout the interrogation 
process. (Emphasis Suppl~ed) 384 U.S. 
at :.69. 
The :-!iranda Court cited Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478, 12 L.Ed. 2d 977, 84 S Ct. 1758 (1964), to stress the 
constitutional importance of informing the examinee of his 
right to remain silent at the outset of the interrogation. 
State case law has also reflected concern over when 
the Naming should be given and the effect of failure to 
give timely warning. In Buckham v. State, 356 So. 2d 1327 
(Fla App. 1978), an officer stoppedand questioned the 
defencant after he was observed dropping a package later 
found to contain narcotics. The court held that the answers 
to the questions \-'ere inaooissible because the defendant had 
not been given the "Miranda Warnings". Furthermore, if the 
sus?ect is not given the necessary warnings his statements 
Nill be inadmissible. In State v. Erho, 463 P.2d 779 (Wash. 
1970), the defendant was given inadequate warnings, after 
whlch he made several incriminating statements. Subsequently, 
-ll-
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he was given proper warings and he made a written confession. 
The later statements were found to be the direct and derivati•:; 
product of the prior "unwarned" oral admissions and hence 
none were admissible. 
In People v. Hutton, 547 P.2d 237 (Colo. 1976), in 
a situation similar to the one at hand, officers questioned 
the defendant concerning a burglary, placed him under arrest 
and then for the first time advised him of his "Miranda 
Rights". (The record reflected that the defendant was not 
free to leave from the time of his first encounter with the 
police). The defendant was again questioned. Both parties 
agreed with the court that the first statement, prior to the 
"Miranda Warnings", was inadmissible. The Supreme Court of 
Colorado upheld the trial court's decision that the staternen: 
taken after a proper "Miranda Warning" was given •...ras also 
inadmissible as it had been obtained under circumstances 
not sufficiently distinguishable to purge it of the 
original taint, citing, Hong Sun v. United States, 371 C.S 
471,83 S.Ct. 407,9 L.Ed. 2d44l (1963). The Colorado 
Supreme Court held that: 
The officers should ----have advised the 
defendant of his Miranda rights before 
questioning him at all. He do not sanction 
their failure to do so by allowing into 
evidence defendant's post-advisement 
remarks. [citation omitted] 546 P.2d at 239 
The Colorado Supreme Court emphasized that the second 
statement was actually a continuation of the first, made on-
a few minutes earlier. The Supreme Court of Co lcrado no tee · 
-12-
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People v. Pinedo, 513 P.2d 452 (1973), the second 
statement was 
. an integral part of the first, 
and therefore, the impermissable 
inducement for the first statement 
carried over to the second statement 
" 513 P.2d at 454. 
Likewise, the case at hand involves two statements, the 
second being but a continuation of the first,but preceded 
by a "Miranda Warning". The second statement should be 
suppressed as it was not purged of the original taint of 
the failure to give the proper warnings at the outset of the 
questioning. This was one interrogation, not two. The hour 
or so of questioning that proceeded the announcement of the 
Appellant's constitutional privileges supplied ample 
opportunity to ". undermine the Appellant's will to 
resist and to compell him to speak where he would not otherwise 
do so freely" in complete contravention of the Miranda 
guide lines. 
Ponn II 
THE APPELLANT DID :-iOT KNOWINGLY AND 
INTELLIGE:-iTLY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT OR HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The Supreme Court in Miranda cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 C.S. 458, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 146 A.L.R. 357 
(1938) as establ~shing the standard forwaiver of constitutional 
rights The Johnson court stated 
It has been pointed out that "courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver" of fundamental 
-13-
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constitutional rights and that 
we "do not presume acquiescence in 
the loss of fundamental rights." 
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional 
relinquishment or aba~donment of a 
known right or privilege. The 
determination of whether there has been 
an intelligent waiver of the right to 
counsel must depend, in each case, 
upon the particular facts and circumstances 
surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of 
the accused. (footnotes and citations 
omitted] 304 U.S. at 464. 
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, is silent on the questions 
of the degree of proof necessary or type of analvsis reGuire: 
for the courts to find that a defendant had knowingly and 
intelligel"':l:: w·aived his rights. The leading cases on this 
question are United States v. Nielson, 392 F 2d 349 (7th Ci: 
1968), United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. ~~· 
and United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 391 CD C. 1973) 
In Unites States v. Nielson, supra. the defendanr :-:ac 
been arrested for auto theft and he refused to sign a waL~e= 
of rights and asked for an attorney. However, ·.,:hen the age::: 
continued to question him he answered the questions. 
held that when a suspect assumes such obviouslv contraJ.ic:c:: 
positions (asserting right to remain silent, then ans·n·erir:€ 
questions) the agents should have been alerted The cour: 
then went on to hold that instead of accepting such an 
equivocal invitiation, before continuing questioning :he 
agents should have inquired further to deterDine if :he ,J. 
was the product of intelligence and understan.:i~g cr c~ 
and confusion. 1...Jhen the government is unable to ,;·",,._, :·:,JC 
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an inquiry was conducted, the court stated that it was 
compelled to conclude that there was no knowing and 
intelligent waiver of rights. 
United States v. Nielson, supra, was distinguished in 
Unite States v. Springer, supra. In Springer the defendant 
had been arrested, read his "Miranda Rights", and signed 
the waiver form. The court found that the signed waiver, 
and the undisputed testimony that the waiver form was read 
and that the defendant understood the contents of the waiver 
was sufficient to raise a presumption of a valid waiver. 
In such a situation the burden of going forward was shifted 
to the defendant. The court found that the reason why the 
burden of going forward had not shifted in Nielson, was 
because the conduct by the defendant in that case was self-
contradictory evidencing a lack of understanding, and in 
Springer, there was no such self-contradictory behavior. 
In Cnited States './. Frazier, supra. the defendant was 
arrested and upon arrest he stated that he knew his rights 
and that at the time he was not under the influence of narcotics 
or alcohol. During the interrogation. however, the defendant 
refused to allow the police officers to take notes and also 
refused to sign a written version of his statements. The 
court held that the burden of proving waiver is on the 
government. 7:Je governr.1ent's burden includes a showing 
that the warnings were ?roperly given and, if the defendant 
raises the isstle. that the defendant was capable of understanding 
t'te ·..:arnings In Frazier. the court found that the defendant 
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never asserted that he misunderstood or misinterpreted 
the words of warning. 
State courts have considered a variety of factors 
in determining if there has been a valid waiver of 
constitutional rights. The defendant's youth at the time 
that the statements were made had been held to be a factor 
to consider along with the other circumstances of the 
interrogation, Tennell v. State, 348 So.2d 937 (Fla. App. l9"" 
but in other jurisdictions a juvenile cannot waive these 
constitutional rights without the aid of an interested adult. 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 372 A.2d 797 (Pa. 1977). Some other 
factors which have been considered are the low intelligence 
of the defendant, Tennell v. State, supra, State V Welch, 
337 So. 2d 1114 (La. 1976), State v. Hahn, 259 ~ W 2d 
753 (Iowa 1977), State v. Thornton, 22 utah 2d 140. 449 P 2c 
987 (1969), the confusion of the defendant at the time the 
warnings were given, State v. Hilpipre, 242 ~.\~. 2d 306 (Io·...::; 
1976), Commonwealth v. Dustin, 368 ~.E 2d 1388 (:1ass. 197;) 
and the emotional stress which the defendant was undergoing 
at the time of the interrogation, State v. LaRoser, 313 A 2c 
375 (R.I. 1974). 
In a very recent decision the Supreme Court has 
reaffirmed its strong reluctance to find a wai·:er of 
"Miranda Rights." In Tague v. Louis ian a, C. S. , Cr im:.~, 
Law Reporter 4166, (decided January 21, 1980), the arres ring 
officer testified that he had read the defendan:: his ":·~ira:1~, 
Rights" from a card, that he could not hinself renenbe:r ·.,ha: 
-16-
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those rights were, nor could he recall whether the 
defendant unde~~tood those rights. The officer could not 
recall whether he determined if the defendant was capable 
of understanding his rights. The Supreme Court held that 
a defendant's capacity to understand his rights cannot be 
presumed from his rote responses to a formal "Miranda" 
type warning and reiterated the doctrine that a heavy 
burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
aganist self-incrimination. 
According to federal and state case law on waiver 
of constitutional rights during interrogation the Appellant 
herein was in a very poor condition to be asked to waive 
those rights. He had been in isolated interrogation at police 
headquarters for a least an hour; with two men accusing him 
of lying and in all likelihood, viewing him as their prime 
suspect. The Appellant was a 20 year old youth who had not 
completed high school and who had an apparent history pointing 
to emotional,if not intellectual, retardation (a fact made 
known to the interrrogators during this interview). Prior 
to this occassion Appellant had had no involvment with the 
criminal justice system and had no particular knowledge of his 
specific legal rights nor any experience in how or why he should 
be concerned about them. \fuen confronted with the choice 
of foregoing legal counsel he expressed confusion and in fact 
turned to his interrogator for the answer. Detective 
Bailess then directly implied he would be better off if he did 
-17-
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not seek legal advice at that time. The legal advice 
he did get in the formalized "Miranda Warning" hardl:r 
offset the multitude of factors, internal as well as 
external, operating to compror'ise his constitutionally 
guaranteed protections or allow him to validly waive 
those protections. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in allowin~ the prosecution to 
use a statement taken fro~ the appellant while he was the 
subject of custodial interrogation. The interrogators 
had failed to inform the appellant of his constitutional 
right to re~ain silent and his right to counsel at the 
outset of the questioning. ',.Jhen finally inforr:1ed of 
these constitutional protections, it was highly likely 
that the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation had 
irretrievably forfeited those safeguards for this young 
and callow appellant. The law sets a ve~r high standard :c: 
demonstrating a waiver of these rights and is :::ost reluctan': 
to assume such a waiver particularly from the rate-r:r?e 
responses as this appellant gave. The error of adr:Jitting 
this statement at trial demands that this court re•:erse t:-.e 
judge's ruling and direct that a new trial be conducted · . .J:':~.:. 
admission of the appellant's statement taken at ?olice 
headquarters on June 1, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted this da:r of >'arc~ .. 1?'30 
LY~m R. 3?0\·t:; 
Attorney for Accell1n" 
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